

Govrn. Politics vol 2.

THE
ANALYSIS
OF THE

Ballance of Power:

WHEREIN

Its Necessity, Origin and History is
examin'd, and deduc'd from the
common Principles of JUSTICE
and SOCIETY.

*Quis sub Arcto
Rex gelidæ mebuature Orae*

H O R E

L O N D O N :

Printed for W. BOREHAM, at the *Angel* in
Pater-Noster-Row, 1720.

[Price One Shilling.]

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Balance of Power:

W. B. E. R. I. N.

and Society.
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examined, and deduced from the
History of the Balance of Power is

— This is the Author's
Key to the preceding

Notes.

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Printed for W. BARNARD, at the Angel in
Pater-Noster-Row, 1720.
[Price One Shilling]



To the Right Honourable

James Craggs, *Esq;*

One of His M A J E S T Y ' S

Principal Secretaries of State.

S. I. R,



THE Treatise I now
have the Honour to
present to you, de-
serves so little to be
given the Worthiest,
that I despair to find on that side
an Excuse for my Presumption in
troubling you with it.

iv *The* DEDICATION.

I am sensible that 'tis not a little will serve to procure me (what I own I don't deserve even from an indulgent Town) Applause: To put your Name at the Head of it, was as much as I could do; and less, I fear, would have been ineffectual.

M E N of your personal Character are subject to be troubled by every one that is, as well as those that are not Strangers to your Person. I am one of the First, having but very little the Honour to be known to you.

I reckon that in some Measure my Happiness; since you cannot know how little he who thus intrudes upon your Protection, is worthy to have you for his Patron.

A N



A N
E S S A Y
U P O N
Justice and Society.

S E C T. I.
Of the Nature and Division of
J U S T I C E.



U S T I C E may be
divided into Specula-
tive and Executive.

T H E first is, that
unalterable Principle imprinted on
B the

the Mind of Man ; *suum cuique tribuere* ; or, as the Logicians say, Justice in *actu primo*.

T H E Second, comprehends the Consequences different Men have drawn from that Principle ; upon which Consequences they build a Rule to judge by ; that is, that the Thing in Question ought to be given to him who seems to have most Right ; or it is Justice in *actu exercito*, according to Logicians.

T H E Necessity of distinguishing between the Principle and the Rule, (tho' conceiv'd in Terms very near equivalent) will appear from this, that in the Principle and in Theory, Justice is positive and abstracted, giving the Right where it ought to be, the Parties concern'd not consider'd.

B U T

BUT in the Rule, since Men are fallible, and not presum'd to judge always right, they follow the Principle as near as they can, and give it for him who appears to them to have most Right ; this being all they can do, tho' perhaps the Party has really least Right.

WITH this View, the Word Justice has Three different Significations.

FIRST, That proportionable Distribution of Good, according to the Rights of those concern'd, or of Bad according to their Demerits, in Cases that are within the Rule. This is what is call'd Justice in the most receiv'd, as well as the truest Sense.

SECONDLY, Equity, in Cases not directly comprehended within the Rule, whereby it is neither inverted nor enlarg'd ; only a Remedy is provided for the griev'd Party *è re nata*, where Circumstances concur impossible to have foreseen.

THIRDLY, Necessity, which is properly an Exception from the Rule, and which may obtain, as well in equitable Cases (every one of these being to be consider'd as a separate Rule within itself) as in Cases of extensive Justice.

THE first (call it Law) is of two sorts.

FIRST, that private Principle of giving every one his Due, as it is lodg'd in the Breast of each Individual,

dividual, or the different Consequences each Man has drawn for himself from the Rule.

SECONDL Y, the Collection of the Opinions of the Majority in a Commonwealth; the Result of which is, that their Determinations shall be deposited in the Hands of publick Persons, for Order and Dispatch in Execution.

BUT as our Nature is much more subject to failing in Point of Justice, than going too far ; it has been thought necessary in some Commonwealths, to give Rules to the Trustees in the Execution.

REASONING thus, since Justice is laid down as a Rule, consequently not to be rashly departed from

from, we ought to examine carefully whether the present Case may not be comprehended in it ; if 'tis, we judge of it accordingly ; if not, we remit it to another Officer, who has Power to judge in extraordinary Cases.

OTHERS again have argu'd thus: It wou'd be an unpardonable Fault to straiten People in the Execution of any Thing where they are naturally but too apt to be remiss ; therefore tho' Justice is a Rule, yet as no Rule is so general as to extend to all Cases, nor so infallible as to have no Exceptions, 'tis but one Trouble to lodge the Power of judging in all different Cases in one Man or Set of Men, who may retrench the Rule where it is exorbitant, and lay down others, where it falls short.

A N D

A N D thus all Magistracy begun, whether limited or absolute.

T H O S E Nations who limited their Trustees for Execution, have generally agreed to give him other Privileges to support his Dignity, and recompence his Trouble. The others thought, that one whom they had trusted with the absolute Direction of their Laws, was not to be manag'd in any other Trust; so they gave up the Disposal of their Lives and Fortunes to him. And that respect they had for his wise Decrees, bred in time a Deference to his Person; nay, an extravagant Submission to his Follies, a regard for his Posterity, and a Resignation to their Wills for his sake, upon a Supposition of their Wisdom and Vertue,
let

let them be never so silly or undeserving.

'T IS hard to make a Parallel between these Two, they have both their Advantages: The Limitations in the first Scheme tie up the Hands of an ill-inclin'd Magistrate, and leave a good One room enough to exert himself. In the other, the Absoluteness of good Magistrates gives them a larger Field to show themselves in; and the greater their Power is, their People are so much the Happier.

BOTH have their Disadvantages too. In the first Model, that Unwillingness to depart from the Rule, must occasion wresting the Sense both of the Rule and of the Case; and, as a Consequence of that,

a certain Narrowness of Thinking in People accustom'd to that Way.

N E X T, since their Officer of Equity is not suppos'd to judge absolutely in those Cases that come before him, but to reduce all of them to Rules subordinate to the first, as well as he can, he must be subject to Mistakes in Cases to which his Rules don't extend; and to Corruption, whether they do or not; since his Rules can never be brought to Witness against him, being only invented by himself as Helps to his Judgment.

I N the other, this last Exception has its full Force in all the Cases that can be put; for if one Man has a Power to judge in every Case whether it is within the Rule or not,

C

he

he easily may explain the Sense of the Rule away from the Case, or throw that of the Case out of the Rule.

BESIDES, the Freedom from Limitations, leaves an ill Prince an unconfin'd Power of doing Mischief.

IN the main, the first seems to be the best. Because if the first Court explains a Case to be out of the Rule, there is still a *Dernier Resort*, and the Power of that *Dernier Resort* must be less dangerous than that of the one only Judicature in the second Scheme, because fewer Cases can come before it.

EQUITY comes within the Notion of Justice, if this last is taken for the unalterable Principle, because the same Principle serves for both ;

both ; but if it is taken for the Rule, Equity will be found to be as I have represented it.

WHICH makes another very great Difference between the Object of Justice, the Principle *Jus summi cuique tribuere*, and the Rule in judging, Whose is the Thing in Question? In Law as well as Equity, the first stands good : But as the Rule in judging is the Result of different Mens Interpretations of the first Principle, Equity comes to be a particular Study.

I think there is a good Reason to distinguish carefully between Equity and Necessity. For by what has been said, it appears, that Law is a Kind of Medium between the one and the other : That Equity ob-

tains only in these Cases, where the Law is not presum'd to see a Right in any other, but in the Party the Judges give it for: That the Judges in Law can't give the Thing in Question to one who appears to them to have no Right, as far as their Jurisdiction will let them see it, (for as to any Thing further, they are not presum'd to see) but must decide according to the Right that appears to them, join'd with the Restrictions they are subject to, in reasoning upon the Principle, *summ cuique*: But that, as there is another View in which it may be taken, that of Equity, the griev'd Party has leave to seek his Remedy there.

JUST so in ordinary Jurisdiction, the Judges, as they have no
Power

Power to give the Thing in Question to one who has no Right, (which constitutes Equity) so they have as little Power to withhold it from one who has Right, let the Consequence be what it will.

F O R this Reason it became necessary in every Common-wealth, to establish a Power one where or other, for correcting the Redundancy of the Rule.



S E C T.

SECT. II.

*Of JUSTICE as it concerns
Society.*

WHEN Mankind first enter'd into Society, each Individual came in with this tacit Proviso, that he should be subject to their Rules ; the first and strongest of which is, That a Part ought to yield to the Good of the Whole.

THIS was in effect explaining the Principle, *jus suum cuique tribuere*, for every Individual, that it should extend only so far as he had reserv'd his Rights to himself, without resigning them.

BY which means the Plea of every Man came to be this ; I have a Right to be maintain'd in my Property,

perty, in Consequence of that virtual Contract between me and the Society, of which I am a Member ; except in so far as I have renounc'd my Rights my self.

N O R is it any Objection to say, I never gave such Consent ; I must necessarily be born in some one Society or other, and I never agreed to this Servitude on my Property in this, any more than in another State.

F O R the Society's Part of the Contract is tacit too ; and if for your Obedience and Faithfulness, you have Protection and Security, the Ballance is vastly on your Side. Since their Part of the Obligation is one continu'd Act of Performance ; and the only way you can possibly
be

be at a Loss, has an immense Chance not to happen.

BESIDES, as they can call upon you for Performance of your Part of the Bargain, to yield, if Occasion be, to the Good of the Whole ; so you can challenge them to afford you Protection and Liberty, according to the mutual Obligation.

BUT as the Rule is to be strictly observ'd, that it shall not be thought defective on the equitable Side, unless some undeniable Reason appear, so, *à fortiori*, it shall never be constru'd to make a Man suffer in a Thing to which he would otherwise have an indisputable Title, unless the Necessity is manifest.

T O

TO this purpose, in most Common-wealths, the Power of judging of the Necessity in particular Cases, is lodg'd in no one Man, nor Set of Men, but left wholly to the Discretion of Individuals, who are afterwards examin'd upon't, and censur'd or rewarded, acquitted or or punish'd, as the Necessity appears to have been greater or less.

TO this may be referr'd, pulling down Houses in a Fire, seizing suspected Persons, and the like; in which Cases the Consent of the Magistrate is not previously requir'd, but the Person afterwards judg'd of, as he had more or less Reason for what he did.

THE Power of pardoning Crimes in the King was at first a
D Con-

Consequence of the Necessity of
Establishing this Law.

T H A T Power is not a Privilege granted to him to make him greater or more conspicuous than his Subjects, but a saving Clause necessary for their Preservation.

F O R in the Cases above, and in another which I shall take Notice of presently, the Party may be condemn'd by the Judge upon the Fact, and acquitted by the King upon the Reasons for it. Indeed this Power has been, and now is, extended to a great many Cases of Equity as well as Necessity, (the very Nature of it being repugnant to Limitations) but I am persuaded this was the first Occasion of it.

I F

I F so, then the King cannot part with his Privilege of Pardon-
ing, for it must be lodg'd some
where of necessity; and elsewhere
it cannot, since it was given him
not as an Ornament to his Dignity,
but as a Deposit for the Uses I have
spoke of.

T H E very extending this Power
of judging of the Necessity, to
Cases beyond the Purview of the
first Grant, is enough to shew how
dangerous it is when in the King,
both for civil and criminal Cases;
that is, in other Words, when the
Prince is absolute Master of the Le-
gislation.

T H E Power of pardoning
Crimes only is for many Reasons
less dangerous; because any Man

with his Wits about him will see the ill Consequences that must attend it ; because Villains are less apt to move Compassion ; because it is never suppos'd to be done without some pretence at least either of Necessity or Equity, and because the doing it is no direct Injury to any Man.

BUT when this Power (I mean that of contracting the Rule) is entrusted to one Man in civil Cases, the Danger is obvious, because the Consequences are worse than in the other Case, tho' not so easily seen ; because it may be the Case of deserving Men, Widows, or Orphans, whose personal Merit or unfortunate Circumstances might create an ill tim'd Pity ; because the Pretences in Equity or Necessity are more fallacious,

ous; and lastly, because if the Thing is wrong judg'd of, it is a direct Injury to some body or other, and an infringement of their Property.

ALL that can be said of this Law of Necessity is clearly stated in the Case I premis'd above to speak to, that of Self-Defence: Immediately indeed belonging to the Law of Nature, yet which may be brought in as between two Members of the same Society. Tho' he that was kill'd had Title to call upon the Common-wealth to maintain him in his Right to have his Life secur'd, yet that was no otherwise than as he observ'd their Regulations, one of which is, That he should not presume to attempt the Life of another who has the same Right.

NOT.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, in some Countries the Judges have no Power to acquit a Man, tho' it appears what he did was in Self-Defence, but it must be remitted to the Prince. In this Nation indeed, and most others, the King has, as it were, given a general Pardon to all in these Circumstances, by parting with his Prerogative of acquitting them, to the Judges.

If one should kill a Man, who had his Piece presented to fire at the King, the Judge must pronounce Sentence on him as in Cases of Murder, but it is necessary the King should have it in his Power to pardon him.

IN civil Cases, this Power may be lodg'd in limited Trustees without

out Danger, for they are oblig'd to judge upon good Reasons and Proofs of the necessity at their Peril; which the King, where he is vested with that Power, needs not do.

A S in pulling down Houses for Fire, seizing suspected Offenders, or throwing overboard a Cargo to lighten the Ship in a Storm; if the Judge is satisfy'd as to the Necessity, he is oblig'd by his Office to acquit the Defendant.



SECT.

SECT. III.

Of the Origin of SOCIETIES, and their Divisions.

SOCIETIES may be divided into two Sorts, Voluntary and Necessary.

WHEN Mankind first enter'd into Society, it is probable, that People finding one among them more skilful in the Arts of Life than the rest, resolv'd, for their mutual Interest, to submit to him and be guided by him. In those Days when the Inhabitants were few, and the Ground more than sufficient for them, one that could skilfully canton out their Cattle in good Pasture, and know what Corn every Soil would

would best bear, would be look'd upon as an useful Man, be respected and obey'd ; for as to one Man's seizing the Government by Force, I neither can see the Use, nor comprehend the Possibility of it.

DESIRE of Riches could not be the Motive of it, for that begun with Society ; nor could the Conveniency of them be known while every Thing was in common, as before Society begun it certainly was.

THIRST of Power could as little be the Reason of undertaking it ; since if this Ambition was only to do good to his Fellow Creatures, no Man of these good Inclinations would use so unjustifiable Means ; and if it was that he might have it in his Power to gratify his

E Passions

Passions and Cruelty, one can hardly imagine how a single Man could be foolish enough to attempt it, and fortunate enough to succeed.

ONE Way is left to account for that Scheme, That he by good Offices or otherwise made himself a Party strong enough to compel the Rest to submit, in which Case my Position is safe, since that Party must have been the Foundation of Society, which consequently begun by Consent.

A N O T H E R Way might be, That the Patriarchs, who liv'd Nine Hundred Years, and had by the Law of Nature the Direction of their Descendants, might in that Time see their Generation vastly multiply'd ; and that these numerous Families
having

having been so long accustom'd to the Rule of one Man, after his Death, should agree to chuse another, and submit themselves to him, to avoid falling into Confusion, in a Way new to them. And thus different Nations might have begun.

THIS Opinion does not want Foundation in Scripture. *Nabor* was Father of the *Israelites*, *Ismaelites*, *Edomites*, *Ammonites*, and *Moabites*. *Abraham* of the Three First. *Isaac* the First and Third, and *Jacob* of the First. And generally in Scripture the Name given to any Nation is, Children to their first Founder. As Children of *Amaleck*, Children of *Heth*, &c.

THE prodigious Encrease of *Jacob's* Posterity came from Seventy
 E 2 Seven

Seven Persons, all his own Descendants, who all liv'd in his own Days. And Servants were not comprehended, as appears by that List, as also by this, that he did not employ Stewards, but his own Sons, to go down and buy Corn in *Ægypt*.

INDEED this was long after the prodigious Ages of the Patriarchs had ceas'd. But my Argument is so much the stronger: For when lesser Families found it for their Interest to submit to one Man, greater ones *à fortiori* would, for their Confusion would be much more to be dreaded.

BUT which of them soever it is, 'tis probable that all Societies begun by Consent; and tho' now they are in some Measure compulsory,
yet

yet the Individuals being consider'd as the Descendants of the voluntary Affociates, claim under them, and are Members of the Society by the same Title.

A T least (not to dispute about the Word *Voluntary*,) 'tis plain that these Societies are very different from necessary Ones.

THAT is, Societies bound together by their Interest only.

NOT that the others are not bound by their Interest too : For certainly it was Interest that first cemented them, and still keeps them together ; but their principal Title is Descent, or Voluntary Entry.

THE

THE others are of that kind of Persons, Bodies Collective which never Die, and may be properly said to come in by Purchase, since every Member is himself the Original Proprietor, by the Title by which he claims.



SECT. IV.

*Of necessary SOCIETIES,
and of the Ballance of
Power.*

YOU see that hitherto Justice has been treated of as Executive, and so indeed it must with respect to all Individuals ; for every one of them being subject to some one Common-wealth or other, is also subject to the Regulations of that Common-wealth, and its Executive Power.

BUT in Bodies Collective, it is to be taken in a wider Sense.

FOR since there never was a mutual Consent to the establishing
such

such Societies, it is plain there can be no where lodg'd a regular Executive Power.

AND as they are bound together by invifible Ties, and guided by their Interest, which is variable, fo there can be no certain Rule laid down for judging.

ONE Confequence of this is, that Law and Equity will be the fame; for where there is no certain Rule, there can be no extraordinary Cafes; fo that every Thing which belongs to any Member in Equity, is alfo his in ftrictest Juftice.

IT follows then, that they muft be guided not by the Collective Rule, but by that undetermin'd one, which is the confequential Interpretation

tation of the Principle by each different Society in the Commonwealth, consider'd as an Individual.

'TIS plain likewise, there can be no written Regulations to which the Members are subject.

BUT there are certain essential Positions, which belong to the Nature of the Society, and which every Member must necessarily acknowledge. For Example, that an Enemy to the Society in general is to be repell'd, tho' perhaps in Friendship or Alliance with some particular Member.

A L S O, that the Society is to be preserv'd, tho' perhaps to a particular Member's Detriment. For when he enter'd into the Society,
F it

it was for his Interest; he expected of the Body Protection from Violence, and Maintenance in his Rights; they exact of him nothing more than Obedience to their essential Rules, and an Acknowledgment of their most important Tie, *suum cuique tribuendum*; to which nothing can be more consonant, than this other Maxim, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*; nor any Thing more repugnant, than to challenge all the Advantages of the Society and bear none of the Loss.

'TIS no Objection to say, that if a Thing is my Property, I have a Right to be maintain'd in it by Virtue of the Principle *suum cuique*; for every other Member having enter'd into the Society for their Interest, as you did, and their Interest being

being in the Eyes of the Society equally important with yours; the first Consequence of that Principle will be, that 'tis unreasonable for one who refuses to bear any of the Loss, to pretend to any of the Profit.

N O R can you elude Execution by saying, you are not of the Society; for since it did not begin by Consent but Interest, it is for the Advantage of the Society almost as much as for yours that you should be maintain'd in your moderate Rights: So that you are intitled to a Part of the Profit, and consequently subject to a Part of the Loss, necessarily, and whether you will or no,

F R O M all this it appears, that the Execution in Societies of Bodies Collective is by Virtue of an extraordinary

ordinary Jurisdiction, not taking Place but *è re nata*, as Cases happen.

A N D that for the Security of the whole a particular Member may suffer in his rightful Possessions, much more be disturb'd in his Usurpations.

T H E Test of this Necessity of spoiling a particular Member for the Good of the whole Body, is what is call'd the Ballance of Power.

B U T there is still one great Difficulty. How is this Necessity to appear? For, as is suppos'd, there is no general Meeting of the Members to concert their common Measures, and judge of their common Interest.

A N D,

A N D, I think, their Interest will make it appear. For since nothing is to be constru'd unjust or exorbitant, unless it is against the Interest of the Majority, where the Majority concurs to think themselves in Danger or injur'd, 'tis Cause enough of Complaint.

F O R the Judgment of one's Interest comes naturally; and wherever the Majority unite, the Interest of the Majority is certainly concern'd.



S E C T. V.

*Of the Ballance of Power
according to the different
Sorts of Potentates.*

THIS will be much clearer
when we have examin'd of
what use this Ballance of Power
is.

TH E Archbishop of *Cambray*, in
his Essay on the Ballance of Power,
ranges all the different Dispositions of
Power that can happen in several
Members of such a Society, into
Three Classes.

TH E First comprehends those,
to whom all the rest is an Over-
poise ; none of them separately, or
no

no League of any under the whole,
being equal to them.

T H E Second is of those, whom
all the rest can't counterballance.



I N the Third, are those smaller
States, which preserve themselves by
uniting together, or with some
greater Ones, against a great One.

T H E Fourth is made up of
those great States, which are nearly
equal.

H E concludes, that those of the
last Class are the Happiest and
most Perfect of all.

I F there was no such Thing on
Earth as Injustice, there would be
no

no Occasion for a Ballance of Power; for the strongest might take what belong'd to him rightfully by Donation, Purchase, or otherwise, and yet the weaker have nothing to fear.

N A Y further, if Princes understood their own Interests, there would be no need of a coercive Power to restore the Ballance in the first Class; for a wise Prince must necessarily see that if his State grows unwieldy, it must be crush'd by its own Weight at last: So he will chuse to keep it from growing too bulky, and content himself with being able to restore the Ballance, in Case any of the lesser Powers attempt to disturb it.

IN

IN the Second Class, there is no Ballance at all.

IN the Third, a Ballance is necessary, because the Fourth State being the most perfect, every one will be endeavouring to raise himself so high: Then it becomes the Business of those in the Fourth and First Classes to restore it.

IN the Fourth, (still supposing Princes to understand their Interests perfectly,) a Ballance is needless; for such States are already at the highest Point of their Fortune; and any Thing added to them, or taken from them, leaves them in a worse Condition.

AND indeed, the most perfect State, in which 'tis possible to conceive such a Society of Bodies Collective,

lective, is that all their Members should be equally Strong. For if the particular Members act wisely, none will seek to enlarge his Power. And if he does, the rest are able to keep him within Bounds.

IF the History of the Ballance were examin'd into, it will be found that all the Efforts of different States have ended in this Fourth Class.

WHEN a Prince of the First Class transgresses his Bounds, his Neighbours try to correct him : If they get the better, his Hands are ty'd up from the possibility of making any more Attempts of that kind : And he is reduc'd to one of the Fourth Class. If they are worsted, it comes at last to the same Thing.

FOR

FOR he rises to one of the Second Class: Then his own Weight splits him into several States of the Third; who set themselves immediately a working to get up to the Fourth.

AND there they remain with but little Chance of changing, because their Equals will always be a Match for them, and these join'd with their Inferiors will be an Overmatch.



S E C T. : VI.

*The History of one Revolution
of the Ballance of Power,
with its present State.*

THE Roman Empire began very low. Their Conjunction with the *Sabines*, the demolishing of *Alba*, and other Cities, and the Transplantation of their Inhabitants, *Appius Claudius's* coming over to them from *Clusium*, and gradual Conquests of their Neighbours by slow Degrees, rais'd them to a level with the *Carthaginians*.

IN these Days the Ballance of Power was very little understood. The *Romans*, no doubt, had heard that *Philip* of *Macedon* had conquer'd most of *Dalmatia* and *Illyricum*, that his
Son

Son *Alexander* had subdu'd the *East*,
 and that their Successor *Pyrrhus*
 aspir'd to the universal Monarchy;
 yet we don't hear they were so apprehensive
 of the first Two, as to consider there was
 but a short Passage by Sea, between *Italy* and them;
 or that they so much as thought of the last,
 till he came over himself, and fought against
 them in Person in the Bowels of a Country
 they had conquer'd.

THE same Indolence possess'd
 the other States in *Europe* at that
 Time. They could look calmly on
 and see the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*
 dispute together about the Protection
 of a single Island, little imagining
 that they and the Empire of the whole
 World were the Subject of Debate.

THE

THE *Romans* conquer'd. Thus having pass'd thro' the Third and Fourth States, they saw themselves in the First. The *Parthians* in the *East*, and continual Insurrections of their Conquests of *Gaul*, *Spain* *Germany*, *Britain* &c. were hardly a Counterpoise to them. As it prov'd; for in *Augustus's* Time, the *Parthians* submitted, all their Conquests were in Quiet, and the Temple of *Janus* was shut.

THIS almost miraculous that for the Space of between Two and Three Hundred Years they could maintain themselves in so ticklish a Situation. But at last, Luxury, Ambition Tyranny, Avarice, and false Measures, had their infallible Effect. The Empire broke; and like

like Water thrown from a great height,
it fell to the Ground in Drops.

T H E N that natural Inclination,
that centripetal Force as it were, to
be of the Fourth Class, begun to
Work. The poor Remains of the
Roman Greatness in the *East*, was
at last over-run by the *Turks*, who
from a very small Beginning have
rose to a State of the Fourth Kind,
being a Match or nearly so to the
Empire on one side, the *Czar* on an-
other, and *Persia* on a Third.

T H E Empire of *Germany* came
early into the Hands of one Man,
and so rose to a Fourth State.

FRANCE, from a Collection
of little Kingdoms, grew at last by
Conquests and Encroachments to the
Degree

Degree of a First State : Where we in our own Days have seen it, and in a Condition to be chastis'd for its Folly and Ambition, if the Power that held the Ballance had not unfortunately mistaken the Scale.

Y E T I can't forbear wishing *Europe*, and particularly my Countrymen of this Island Joy, upon the happy Disappointment of the Prospects every *Frenchman* (even the good Archbishop of *Cambray* himself) had of the Greatness of *France*, if King *Charles* the Second of *Spain* should Die. He dy'd, nor was any of them mistaken in judging of the Designs of a Prince, who thought publick Faith, and the Happiness of his People, but an inconsiderable Sacrifice to his Ambition. I hope *Germany* will not forget who it was
that

that rescu'd her from inevitable Ruine. And that *Holland* will remember in the Year 1667, when *France* had it in her Power, her nearest Neighbours were always the least safe : That Caution, sure, is needless to us, who saw and still think with Horror and Indignation upon the wretched Condition we would have been in, had we become Slaves to a Vassal of *France*.

THE Powers of *Christendom* seem now to labour at bringing back the Equilibrium, by advancing the Empire to a Degree of Equality with *France*.

SPAIN was over-run first by *Vandals*, and then by *Moors*. Both of them founded several Kingdoms; all of which (except *Portugal*) are

H now

now united. Within these 200 Years, it bid fairer for the universal Monarchy than any State since the time of the *Romans*. But the Death of *Charles* the 5th, which separated *Germany* from it; the Revolt of *Holland*; *Flanders*, *Burgundy*, and *Franche Comtè* conquer'd by *France*; *Brabant*, *Milan*, *Sicily* and *Naples* yielded to the Emperor; and *Sardinia* to the Duke of *Savoy*; with *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* dismember'd in favour of *Great Britain*; have brought it so low, that it is now no better than a Fourth State, if so good.

G R E A T Britain is the Sum of Seven Kingdoms of *England*, those of *Scotland* and *Ireland*, and the Principality of *Wales*, all at different Times united under one King. It
may

may justly challenge the Name of one of the best and most moderate of the Fourth States, since it never affected to enlarge its Dominions, nor would ever bear to have them diminish'd. This Wisdom has been eminent in some of our Kings, and Posterity will find in the Example of our present Glorious Monarch a Pattern hard to be imitated, of Watchfulness for the Rights of his Kingdom, and disinterested Service to his distressed Neighbours.

IN *Muscovy* we have an Instance of a State of the First kind, till lately ignorant of its Strength ; being near a Match for the other *Northern* Crowns.

THE States of the Third kind scatter'd up and down *Europe* are of Three forts.

1. THOSE who finding themselves unable to resist a strong Neighbour, have put themselves under the Protection of one equal to him: As *Lorrain, Modena, Parma, Courland, &c.* have done.

2. THOSE who for their mutual Security have associated themselves together into regular Societies. Such as the Empire, *Swisserland*, the *Grisons*, and the Seven Republicks of the United *Netherlands*.

3. THOSE who by the help of stronger Allies are able support themselves. As the Republicks of *Venice, Genoa, Holland* and the *Helvetick*

vetick Body collectively, the Kings of *Poland*, *Prussia*, *Portugal*, *Denmark*, *Sweden*, and *Sardinia*.

THIS is only to give a general View of the Inconstancy of the Ballance, by shewing one Revolution of it, from the *Roman* Times till these



SECT.

S E C T. VII.

General Observations from the whole.

FROM what has been said it will appear,

FIRST that voluntary Societies would have subsisted, tho' there had never been any such Thing as Injustice in the World. For the First Societies of that kind ('tis probable) began from a Deference to the superior Wisdom of the Man to whom they entrusted the Sovereignty. Which might have happen'd even in a State of Innocency: Unless you will suppose that in such a State, every one was equally Wise.

LIKE-

LIKEWISE, that the different Members in such Societies might have separate Interests, even in such a Case, which nevertheless by the Rules of the Society, they were oblig'd to forgo. As, going about the publick Business, which one would rather not do perhaps, unless it was for his Obligation.

SECONDLY, that by the Law of Nature there are no necessary Societies, of the kind we have spoke of. For since the Design of them is to maintain one's just Rights, and repel Violence, the Policy ceases in a State where no Violence can be suppos'd, and where our Rights, as it were, maintain themselves.

THIRDLY, and of Consequence from the last, there could be
no

no Ballance of Power, as has been said above.

FOURTHLY, that voluntary Societies are much more perfect and innocent than necessary ones. For those can subsist, tho' the strictest Rules of Morality and Religion were inviolably observ'd: Whereas the others by their very Foundation suppose a Wrong, and can't stand without it.

FIFTHLY, it will be found that these States are in a better way to be preserv'd, and less subject to the Caprice of the Ballance, who have associated themselves into regular Societies; as the Empire, the *Helvetick* Body, and the *Dutch* have done, than those, who (being little States) have nothing to trust
to

to, but the Chance of making Alliances : It was with this View that the *Abbé St. Pierre* wrote his Book, of a Project for establishing a Senate of *Europe*, in which executive Powers should be lodg'd, and the Interest of the Majority more clearly judg'd of, and the Power of dispossessing Usurpers, restraining the Violence of an impetuous Conqueror, or depriving a formidable Member of part of his Power, ascertain'd. I don't say it was or was not practicable ; but this I say, if 'twas a Chimæra, 'twas a delightful one. The first Model of this Kind that I now remember was the Council of the *Amphictions* in *Greece*. And indeed it was wonderful that States almost in a continual War among themselves, should so unanimously consent to repel outward Force, and

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that

that it was not in the Power of the mighty King of *Persia* to make one poor State withdraw its Assistance from the Commonwealth, with all the Promises of Protection and Greatness. 'Tis hard to refer this to Interest, for the Ballance was then very little understood, but to a Habit in each Man to look upon every Body but a *Greek* as a *Barbarian*, and upon every *Greek* as his Countryman, tho' of a different State and Interest ; which could be maintain'd no other Way, but that the Representatives of every State met often together, and were taught to confer like Friends. The Diet of *Germany* is something yet better invented ; every one of the smallest States being preserv'd in the same Independence, with which it enter'd into the Society. And had the Council

Council of the *Amphictions* had as much Power as the Diet of *Germany* in censuring its Members, and giving Orders for Execution, 'tis likely *Philip* of *Macedon*'s Greatness been crush'd in the Bud; and the World spar'd the Tryal of believing the prodigious Things History tells of his Son.

THEY knew not the Delight of being content with their Condition. That King is happy indeed, who bounds his Ambition by his People's Good. He has the grateful Harvest of their Love for his Care. He shall find his Reward who rejoices at his People's Happiness, and is not deaf to the Groans of his Neighbour, over-ballanc'd and oppress'd. His Reign shall be long and glorious; he shall see in his own
Time

Time his Childrens Children and
 their Children; to whom when he
 dies, (Heaven retard the Hour!) he
 shall leave a Throne, firm, beyond
 a possibility to be shaken by Fools
 or factious Men.

F I N I S.



